Inetrsection of Contractual Licencing and Competition Policy in the Digital Realm in India

Abstract

Contractual licensing and competition policy intersect profoundly in India's digital realm. Contractual licensing arrangements have the potential to foster anti-competitive behavior in various ways, posing significant challenges to market competition and consumer welfare. One common mechanism is the inclusion of exclusivity clauses, which grant one party exclusive rights to a product or service, thereby creating barriers to market entry and stifling competition. Additionally, licensing agreements may include price-fixing provisions or other restrictive terms that eliminate price competition, inflate prices, and limit consumer choice. Tying and bundling arrangements further exacerbate anti-competitive effects by leveraging market power in one product or service to gain an unfair advantage in another, ultimately reducing innovation and consumer welfare. Furthermore, practices such as patent holdup and exclusive dealing can hinder competition by imposing unfair terms on potential competitors or foreclosing rivals from accessing essential resources or distribution channels. Contractual licensing can lead to anti-competitive behavior through various mechanisms that distort market dynamics, hinder competition, and harm consumer welfare. This research investigates the intersection of contractual licensing agreements and competition policy in India's digital economy, aiming to elucidate their implications for market dynamics, innovation, and consumer welfare.