Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://gnanaganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/1998
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDan N. Stone-
dc.contributor.authorStephanie M. Bryant-
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-07T11:20:56Z-
dc.date.available2023-11-07T11:20:56Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://gnanaganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/1998-
dc.description.abstractThis paper extends self-determination theory (SOT) to investigate the unreliability of financial incentives as motivators. The proposed model predicts that core financial need beliefs influence financial values, which in turn influence "hedonic" utility, i.e., happiness. Four financial need belief constructs are proposed and measured: (1) financial self-efficacy, (2) financial autonomy, (3) financial community-trust, and (4) financial community-support.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherBEHAVIORAL RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTINGen_US
dc.subjectSelf-determination theoryen_US
dc.subjectFinancial incentivesen_US
dc.subjectFinancial needsen_US
dc.titleWhy Are Financial Incentive Effects Unreliable? An Extension of Self-Determinationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
Appears in Collections:Article Archives

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
WHYARE~1.PDF
  Restricted Access
Why Are Financial Incentive Effects Unreliable10.94 MBAdobe PDFView/Open Request a copy


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.